Russia, West in stare-down over Caucasus

First published in August 30, 2008 Armenian Reporter.

Russia, West mull options in stare-down over Caucasus
Citing Kosovo, Moscow recognizes Abkhaz, Ossetian independence
by Emil Sanamyan

Russian navy cruiser Moskva (seen in earlier photo) dropped anchor in Abkhazia this week.

WASHINGTON – Moscow on August 26 recognized the independence of Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which broke away from Georgia’s rule in the early 1990s.

The bold move came just two weeks after the end of Russia’s military campaign in Georgia in defense of the two republics. It aroused a new round of condemnation from the United States and most Western states.

But it remained unclear what exactly Georgia’s Western backers could do to enhance that state’s security without undermining their own priorities.

Most observers suggested that U.S. efforts to contain Iran and continue operations in Afghanistan may immediately suffer from a cool-down in relations with Russia.

Moscow has also threatened to reciprocate with an embargo on American goods should there be any U.S. sanctions. (Both General Motors and Ford now have plants in Russia.)

For major European powers like Germany and Italy, Russian energy supplies clearly take priority over Georgia.

So far, U.S. officials have employed tough rhetoric, with some arguing that the United States should help re-arm the decimated Georgian military.

Vice President Dick Cheney will be touring Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine during the first week of September in a visit apparently intended to shore
up shaken U.S. influence. His visit will almost certainly feature more harsh talk.

The steady stream of U.S. visitors has in recent weeks included the wife of Republican presidential hopeful Sen. John McCain and three U.S. senators, including Foreign Relations Committee Chair Sen. Joe Biden, who this week became the Democratic Party’s nominee for vice president of the United States.

In addition, two U.S. vessels arrived in the Black Sea for an earlier scheduled exercise and delivered humanitarian aid to Georgia in a show of mostly symbolic support.

Turkey’s refusal to allow larger U.S. vessels into the Black Sea prevented a more impressive show of symbolism.

Meantime, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea fleet arrived in Abkhazia, where Russia will soon be establishing a permanent base. Russians have also promised to raise their naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea.

U.S. Coast Guard cutter Dallas (seen in earlier photo) reached the coast of Georgia this week.

Diplomatic maneuvers

President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia said his nation was “not afraid of anything, including the prospect of a Cold War,” although adding that Russia would prefer to avoid one.

Mr. Medvedev also recalled the United States’ unilateral recognition of Kosovo earlier this year and argued that the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was the only sure way to safeguard peoples’ lives there.

Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, suggested that Russia decided to take the step to recognize the two republics after France – apparently under insistent U.S. pressure – withdrew references to future talks on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from a draft United Nations Security Council resolution, in effect supporting Georgia’s claims on the two republics.

“So, they were the ones who immediately started walking away from this diplomatic opportunity,” forcing Russia to take the “Kosovo route,” the Russian diplomat suggested.

Kosovo, however, has been recognized by 40 countries worldwide, including three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. No such support for Russian recognition is currently anticipated.

In fact, as Armenian expert Aleksandr Iskandarian pointed out this week, Russia’s move is more akin to Ankara’s recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus rather than the U.S.–initiated recognition of Kosovo, which was a long drawn-out process.

The only exceptions, in terms of open support for Russia’s position in Georgia, may come from states closely tied to Russia, such as Belarus and Tajikistan, or openly hostile to the United States, such as Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela.

Eurasian fence-sitting

A majority of Eurasian states, including the fifth permanent member of the Security Council, China, and two regional powers bordering on the Caucasus – Iran and Turkey – have taken a neutral position on the conflict.

Following a meeting between Russian and Chinese leaders at a regional summit in Central Asia, China issued a statement on August 27 that referred to “the complicated history and reality of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia issues” calling for resolution of issues through “dialogue and consultation.”

Importantly, the statement did not refer to anyone’s territorial integrity – something that for China remains the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Chinese leaders may have also taken personally the fact that Georgia launched its attack on South Ossetia on the day of opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing.

Turkey, a NATO member that recognized Kosovo, has not criticized Russia’s actions in Georgia and appeared to welcome signs of a decline of U.S. influence in the Caucasus.

Iran and Israel, both keen on courting Russia, have taken similar positions calling for a peaceful settlement without concrete assessments of the conflict.

On September 1, European Union states will meet in Paris for an emergency session on relations with Russia, but as Moreau Defarges of the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI) suggests, EU members will prioritize a unified message of criticism along with continued dialogue with Russia rather than any concrete sanctions.

“The West is not going to go to war for Georgia,” Mr. Defarges asserted to Radio Liberty.

Georgian leader Mikhail Saakashvili who was expected to attend the European summit no longer plans to; although he explained his decision with reference to a fear that he might somehow be prevented from returning to Georgia.

MCC head: Armenia program “moving ahead in all respects”

Millennium Challenge Armenia program “moving ahead in all respects”
MCC CEO Danilovich, Rep. Knollenberg discuss Armenia aid program
by Paul Chaderjian in Detroit and Emil Sanamyan

DETROIT – Rep. Joe Knollenberg (R.-Mich.), co-chair of the Armenian Caucus and senior congressional appropriator, highlighted the importance of the five-year $235 million Millennium Challenge Corporation’s program in Armenia as Detroit’s Armenian community hosted MCC chief executive Ambassador John Danilovich on August 5.

Interviewed by the Armenian Reporter, Mr. Danilovich said that MCC’s program in Armenia was “moving ahead in all respects,” including rural road programs, which is being financed by the Armenian government.

“It is very impressive that one of our MCC countries is willing to take tangible demonstrable steps to support the MCC program,” he said in reference to Armenia’s decision to step in with its own funding not to miss the good summer weather. This happened after MCC “put a hold on the negotiations aspects of some package of the road works [over] the conduct of elections and what transpired after the elections,” developments that raised concerns in the United States government.

“De-facto the hold [placed by the MCC] is not having an impact on the program” in Armenia because of the government funding, Mr. Danilovich suggested. He added that he has been in regular contact with Armenia’s President Serge Sargsian, who has outlined the steps he is taking to advance democracy
in Armenia and expressed hope for continued progress for Armenia to maintain its eligibility for the assistance program.

He described as “constructive and positive” MCC’s cooperation with Rep. Knollenberg, who is a senior member of the House of Representatives’ Foreign Operations Subcommittee, which oversees budgeting for MCC and other foreign aid programs.

“Rep. Knollenberg and I share a common interest for effective development assistance, for responsible foreign aid, in general, and also specifically in the case of Armenia,” Mr. Danilovich said. He added that the United States is committed to fighting poverty and facilitating Armenia’s progress, and was benefiting greatly from Mr. Knollenberg’s commitment to and understanding of Armenian issues.

The MCC CEO said his meeting with Detroit Armenians and an earlier meeting with the Armenian community in Glendale, Calif., were part of the corporation’s policy to reach out to interested American constituencies such as Armenians, Philippinos, and Salvadorans, whose home countries also stand to benefit from MCC compacts.

Briefly: Biden on Armenia & Georgia, Caucasians in Denver, Georgians ask for $1-2bn, Azeris in California

First published in August 30, 2008 Armenian Reporter.

Washington Briefing
by Emil Sanamyan

Sen. Obama’s running mate pick strong on Armenian issues

Sen. Barack Obama (D.-Ill.) chose Sen. Joe Biden (D.-Del.), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as his running mate last week, and the Democratic National Convention in Denver confirmed him as the party’s vice presidential nominee.

The selection was welcomed by Armenian-American organizations since Mr. Biden has a long track record of supporting Armenian-American concerns throughout his more than 35 years in the Senate.

That record includes support for U.S. affirmation of the Armenian Genocide, including the Senate resolution championed by the Senate Republican Party leader Bob Dole in 1990, supporting all Armenian Genocide resolutions introduced in the Senate since, and pushing for a change in the Bush Administration policy as part of the confirmation process for the U.S. ambassador to Armenia since 2006 and until earlier this summer.

During the July 29 Foreign Relations Committee meeting that confirmed Marie Yovanovitch as U.S. ambassador to Armenia, Mr. Biden noted, “Recognition by the United States of the Armenian Genocide is not the final goal. The real goal is the recognition of Turkey – of the Turkish Government – of the Armenian Genocide and the establishment of a common Turkish-Armenian understanding of the events and tragedy that took place.”

Mr. Biden also supported Karabakh’s right to self-determination and the 1993 U.S. sanctions against Azerbaijan over its aggression against Armenia and Karabakh.

He introduced the 2007 resolution honoring the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink assassinated by Turkish nationalists.

Earlier this year, Mr. Obama himself issued a statement in which he promised to recognize the Armenian Genocide as president and support a Karabakh settlement “that is agreeable to all parties, and based upon America’s founding commitment to the principles of democracy and self determination.”

The Republican Party’s presumptive nominee, Sen. John McCain (R.- Ariz.) has promised no changes in U.S. policies on Armenian issues; he has also yet to select a running mate.

Last year, Mr. Biden also advocated for a robust U.S. response to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region, and was willing to “commit U.S. troops on the ground.”

Meanwhile, Mr. Biden supports U.S. leadership in Armenia’s region and checking Russia’s influence there. In a joint letter with his committee colleague Sen. Dick Lugar (R.-Ind.) last October, Sen. Biden argued that the United States has a “long-term interest in preventing Russian domination of energy [development and transportation] in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.”

Other senior foreign policy advisors to Mr. Obama include President Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, 80, a strong advocate of containing Russia, as well as the Clinton Administration’s National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, 69, and former State Department policy planning director Gregory Craig, 63, both of whom are strong proponents of NATO expansion.

Politicians from Armenia, elsewhere in Denver for Democratic National Convention events

Some 500 foreign officials from about 100 countries were in Denver this week for the International Leaders’ Forum organized by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to coincide with the Democratic National Convention. NDI has organized the event during every convention since 1984 to provide a forum for foreign leaders and the Democratic Party’s foreign policy team.

According to the Armenian Reporter’s information, former Prime Minister Vazgen Manukian of the National Democratic Union and former national security service director David Shahnazarian, a political ally and in-law of ex-President Levon Ter-Petrossian, were expected to attend.

During the Democratic Party’s national convention held in July 2004 in Boston, Armenia was represented by Amb. Arman Kirakossian and Stepan Demirchian of the opposition People’s Party.

This year, Amb. Tatoul Markarian is in Yerevan for the annual gathering of Armenian diplomats and is unable to attend.

Azerbaijan was represented by the presidential administration’s propaganda director Ali Hassanov.

As in years past, perennial government opponents Isa Gamberov and Ali Kerimov were also invited, although it was unclear if either one was attending.

Also in attendance were Georgian Parliament Speaker David Bakradze and Minister for European Integration Georgi Baramidze, who actively lobbied for a tougher U.S. policy on Russia.

Other visitors from Georgia included former Parliament Speaker Nino Bourjanadze and leader of the opposition Republican Party David Usupashvili.

Georgia seeks “1 to 2 billion” dollars in foreign aid

The Georgian government is seeking $1 to $2 billion in aid to repair and develop infrastructure after the war with Russia, USAID Administrator Henrietta Fore said on August 22, www.civil.ge reported citing Reuters news agency.

“Georgia has given us rather a long list of things they would like to see – communications is certainly part of it, hydro-electric dams... That’s really reconstruction, it’s for infrastructure. It’s not just because of hostilities. It’s for development,” Ms. Fore said, adding that “it does not all need to be done by the United States. It can be done by international organizations as well as other bilateral organizations.”

Writing in the Wall Street Journal on August 26, Senators Joe Lieberman (I.-Conn.) and Lindsey Graham (R.-S.C.), who recently visited Georgia on behalf of presumptive Republican presidential candidate John McCain, supported U.S. provision of weapons to Georgia to be able to “deter” Russian forces.

The U.S. Congress is expected to approve a significant aid package to Georgia when it returns from holidays next month, said House of Representatives’ Foreign Relations Committee Chair Rep. Howard Berman (D.-Calif.) and Democratic Policy Committee chair Rep. George Miller (D.-Calif.) who also went to Georgia on August 22.

Georgia has received close to $2 billion in U.S. assistance in the decade and a half since independence.

Azerbaijani officials on propaganda tour of California

The California State Assembly hosted a group of four Azerbaijani officials earlier this month, one of the delegation members Azerbaijani Milli Majlis member Asim Mollazade told Day.az on August 21.

The group visited the two chambers of California’s legislature in Sacramento, Rep. Berman, who represents a Los Angeles–area district, the San Francisco City Council, and the local World Affairs Council.

Mr. Mollazade said he and his colleagues used the opportunity to talk up Azerbaijan’s importance to the world, threats posed by “imperial” Russia, as well as “true reasons” behind the conflict with Armenia.

He singled out the importance of raising the Azerbaijani flag in the California legislature as a significant event.

In September 2007 Azerbaijan hosted a California delegation that included State Senator Sheila Kuehl, State Assembly members Julia Brownley, Betty Karnette, and Lori Saldaña, as well as assistant director of the California State Senate international relations office Shannon Shellenberg.

Ossetia war: five lessons for Armenia

First published in August 23, 2008 Armenian Reporter.

Ossetia War: Lessons for Armenia
by Emil Sanamyan

Burnt Georgian army tanks near the center of Tskhinval, South Ossetia on Aug. 10, 2008.

WASHINGTON – Within hours the long-running stand-off between Georgia and Russia-backed South Ossetia became a full-blown war causing hundreds of deaths, primarily among Ossetians but also among the now-defeated Georgian army.

The fighting took place less than 100 miles from Armenia and had an immediate impact on it. Above all, it exposed the security vacuum in the region, of which Armenia is also a part.

Is Armenia ready for a repetition of a similar scenario in Karabakh?

Immediate results of Russian-Georgian fighting

Half the world away – on the other end of Asia – most of the world leaders, including President George Bush and Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, gathered for the opening of the Olympic Games.

As they sat in the VIP seats of the Beijing stadium, Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili, long-touted as Mr. Bush’s foreign policy “success story” and a thorn in Mr. Putin’s side, threw most of his U.S.-trained army into a savage attack on South Ossetia.

That happened just hours after the Georgian leader, in a televised address, promised to cease shelling of the Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, which was surrounded on nearly all sides by Georgian military positions. As events unfolded, it became clear that the Georgian operation was planned in advance, but its planners had failed to anticipate what came next.

Russia intervened within hours and on a massive scale. Had it not been for that intervention, which resulted in a defeat of the “NATO standard” Georgian army within 48 hours, and subsequent Western diplomacy to check Russian military moves within Georgia, large-scale fighting might well have claimed even more lives.

Nevertheless, the three days of shelling and shooting resulted in nearly a wholesale destruction of Tskhinvali – a town about the size of Stepanakert – and displacement of close to 100,000 people, both Ossetians and Georgians.

The rapid pace of these events, the human toll involved, the apparent shifts in the regional balance of forces and, above all, Armenians’ security predicament in Nagorno-Karabakh necessitate an urgent review of Yerevan’s policies.

Lesson 1: Ethnic hatreds and advanced weapons make for a deadly mix

Mr. Saakashvili studied in some of the best schools in Europe and the United States. He has made it clear that he wants Georgia to be part of Europe. Georgia has already adopted the European Union flag.

While his record on corruption and democracy in Georgia is checkered, under the Saakashvili presidency, Georgia has made obvious progress.

None of this stopped the Georgian president from launching a massive indiscriminate bombardment of South Ossetia and an attempt to wipe out both its small self-defense forces and, effectively, the fewer than 70,000 ethnic Ossetians living in the area.

Now let’s look at Azerbaijan. It has much more money and more deadly firepower than Georgia did before this week. Azerbaijan’s ruling family does not care much for promoting democratic facades or currying Western favor, and it has repeatedly for years threatened to attack Armenia (including the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic).

This combination of capability and stated intent creates an immediate present danger to Armenian lives and must be appreciated more seriously and addressed more effectively than has happened to date both in Armenia and the diaspora.

The quick and devastating defeat of a country that, like Azerbaijan, sought to “restore its territorial integrity,” or more accurately avenge old grievances through fresh violence only to bring new humiliation upon itself, should serve as a cold shower for Azerbaijan.

But Armenians cannot rely on President Ilham Aliyev’s rational cost-benefit calculation.

The risks are just too high. Considering the levels of anti-Armenian rhetoric – which are beyond anything Georgia’s leaders have ever employed vis-à-vis Ossetians, Abkhaz, or Russians – Mr. Aliyev or, to borrow from the words of the Russian president, another “lunatic” Azerbaijani leader may feel the “need to shed [Armenian] blood” overwhelm other cares he or she might have.

The threat is real and must be addressed.

Lesson 2: Crisis preparations are necessary before a crisis arrives

Still, most Armenians – and this is especially true for the diaspora and Yerevan – live in a blissful ignorance of threats their homeland and their lives are facing.

Even among professional individuals whose job it is to protect Armenia and neutralize its enemies, one frequently observes the attitude that Azerbaijan either “doesn’t have the balls,” “doesn’t have the army,” “won’t risk losing oil,” or “the United States and Russia won’t stand for it.”

After the Georgian attack on Ossetia, the Armenian government needs to answer a number of key questions.

Does it consider losing hundreds, if not thousands of civilians within a matter of hours, an acceptable risk? Azerbaijan today has the capability to cause such destruction.

What is it doing to stop the flow of weapon systems to Azerbaijan – particularly the type of weapons that can cause such devastating harm? Like Georgia, Azerbaijan gets most of its weapons, including the more deadly ones, from one state – another Western darling, Ukraine.

What has Armenia done to try to stop and reverse this process? Has the Armenian government made it clear to Azerbaijan that it would too pay a disproportionate price for causing Armenian civilian deaths? How has that been demonstrated?

What has the Armenian government done to prepare its population for a possible attack? Do Armenians sitting in Yerevan cafés, chewing sunflower seeds at opposition rallies, or watching television in their homes know the location of the nearest bomb shelter?

When were Armenian reservists last gathered on any significant scale? When were they last trained or tested? Do they know where to report in case of war?

Crises require more than planning for immediate security and military operations. Considering the rapid nature of warfare today, once again demonstrated in Ossetia, and the role public opinion plays in shaping policy, preparations for crisis management must include a strong media component.

Are Armenian-Americans ready for such a crisis?

Lesson 3: External guarantees carry unacceptable risks

The main reason Georgians thought they could attack Ossetia with impunity is because as part of the peace agreement the parties signed after their brief 1991–92 war, Ossetians had to yield firing positions they captured from Georgians to Russian peacekeepers.

Before the August 8 Georgian assault, Russian peacekeepers repeatedly failed to address recurring violations by Georgia of its agreements and provide for the security of the Ossetian population. As a result, even if Russia intervened faster than anticipated, Ossetian civilians bore the brunt of human casualties and material losses, with their community devastated.

Armenia too experienced “peacekeeping” of Soviet Russian forces when they were sent to “protect” the Armenian-Azerbaijani border in the late 1980s. By 1991, on orders from Moscow, went as far as to help Azerbaijan expel Armenians from parts of Karabakh.

But this is not a Russia-specific problem.

Too many United Nations peacekeeping operations in recent years – from Croatia and Rwanda in the mid-1990s, to more recent NATO policing in Kosovo and African Union operations in Sudan have failed in their stated effort to protect populations whose lives are threatened.

The reality is the peacekeepers and the countries that dispatch them care more about their own security than a foreign country they have pledged to protect.

Armenians are fortunate that foreign peacekeepers were never introduced after the Karabakh war ended in 1994. Combat capabilities of the Armenian Armed Forces along with the territories they currently hold in and around Nagorno Karabakh form two basic foundations of Armenian security.

Lesson 4: The “peace process” must be about strengthening peace and preventing war

Exchanging territories under Armenian control for promises of foreign protection without a clear and unambiguous resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijan dispute carries deadly risks for Armenians.

But, with the possible exception of the 2001 Key West deal, this is exactly what mediators have proposed throughout the conflict mediation efforts that followed the 1994 cease-fire.

This clear and unambiguous document must establish a new border between the two countries and a transparent process of disarmament and demilitarization. Clearly at this time Azerbaijan is not ready for such a resolution and would rather protract the status quo. But, under such circumstances, neither should it receive any of the territories now under Armenian control.

In fact, in recent years, in addition to a refusal to talk peace seriously, Azerbaijan has been following a policy of provocations and testing Armenian positions along the Line of Contact, just as Georgia had in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

The central focus of Armenia’s foreign policy should not be the endless search for a “mutually acceptable” settlement with Azerbaijan, but urgent measures to prevent a repetition of the Ossetia events, only on a more devastating scale between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

This must include strengthening of the cease-fire with Azerbaijan through an expansion of the unarmed international monitoring mission; enforcement of the 1995 agreement on preventing violations of the ceasefire; Azerbaijani pull-out from the no-man’s lands it occupied in recent years dangerously nearing Armenian defense lines; and development of an agreement on the peaceful settlement of the conflict that would include specific disarmament clauses.

As Russia’s retired Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov has warned repeatedly, and most recently just three months ago at a conference in Stepanakert, an Armenian campaign for peace, involving the elements listed, is urgently needed.

Lesson 5: The regional balance of forces has shifted

After years of confused and contradictory policies and an often simply disinterested attitude toward the Caucasus, Russia is back with guns blazing. This is not a Soviet monster, but a new country that very much is trying to be a copycat of the United States, at least in its foreign policy.

Russian propaganda about Ossetia in recent weeks would remind American viewers of what they saw on the eve of and during the Iraq war, including references to humanitarian causes and legal grounding for the intervention, and demonization of the
opponent’s leadership.

In another sign of increased sophistication, Russian armed forces in their Georgia operations have succeeded in limiting the “collateral damage” the air strikes inevitably cause.

The Russian command even accommodated the request of the local officials in the town of Poti, and instead of air strikes on the U.S.- and European-equipped Georgian navy,
Russian military men arrived in person to dynamite and sink Georgian naval vessels at sea at a safe distance away from the port.

Even more impressive was Russia’s ability to deceive Mr. Saakashvili and his U.S. supporters (see story on military operations forthcoming). The apparent trap Russia set for the Georgian army in Ossetia followed by a wholesale dismantlement of the Georgian military infrastructure – for which U.S. taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars or more since 2001 – showed the Russian leadership’s new-found ability to fuse its resource-driven enrichment with inherited intellectual capacities into an effective conduct of war.

Signs that the United States is losing its “unipolar moment,” as some U.S. commentators have described America’s dominance in world affairs since the collapse of the USSR, have been there for some time.

After becoming bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush Administration has so far failed to achieve its goal of confronting Iran effectively. Iran’s neighbors, even the two occupied by the United States, have publicly declined involvement in anti-Iranian policies.

And earlier this year even Israel has for the first time began direct contacts with Iranbacked Hezbollah in Lebanon and, through Turkey’s mediation, resumed talks with Syria.

And this week Turkey, a longtime, but by now apparently former U.S. ally, reportedly declined access to U.S. naval vessels into the Black Sea to deliver aid to Georgia.

Armenia has benefited greatly from its relations with the United States. But America’s contribution to Georgia’s assault on Ossetia raises troubling questions.

As the Ossetians were being devastated on the night of August 8, Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried accused them of “provoking” the Georgian aggression and to this day there has been no clear American condemnation of the Georgian action.

A major lesson of Ossetia war is that Russia, Armenia’s strategic partner, is capable of conducting destructive military operations against a U.S. ally in the Caucasus, and U.S. is powerless to stop Russia.

Armenia’s relationship with Russia has been longer and, on the balance, may be even more positive than with the U.S. But Armenia is also troubled that Russia is now essentially dismantling the Georgian state – one of Armenia’s two oldest and friendliest neighbors.

In these unfortunate circumstances, Armenia should try to contribute to normalization of Russian-Georgian relations by all possible means. But more importantly it should act on lessons learned from this crisis to safeguard Armenians.

Briefly: Russian military punch in Georgia; Saakashvili blamed for fiasco; Turkey sees end of U.S. dominance

Washington Brifing
by Emil Sanamyan

Russia’s military punch in Georgia stuns U.S.

The Bush Administration appeared unprepared for the consequences of Georgia’s failed invasion of South Ossetia and Russia’s subsequent “shock and awe”-type campaign that within days forced Tbilisi to return to a cease-fire on terms worse that it negotiated after its initial defeat in the early 1990s.

Hours after the Georgian military launched a massive bombardment of South Ossetia on August 7 and Georgian officials announced their intention to occupy the breakaway region, Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried blamed the fighting on Ossetian “provocations” and his comments to Reuters news agency suggested that U.S. did not expect Russia to get involved on the scale it eventually did.

“It appears that the South Ossetians have instigated this uptick in violence,” Mr. Fried said. “We have urged the Russians to urge their South Ossetian friends to pull back and show greater restraint. And we believe that the Russians ... are trying to do just that.”

In August 12 analysis, Strategic Forecasting, a leading U.S.-based political risk consultancy, argued that it was “inconceivable” that either the United States or Russia were unaware of Georgia’s preparations to attack South Ossetia. And according to the Washington Post on August 17, Western officials on the ground recorded the Georgian troop, armor and artillery movement throughout August 7.

But, Strategic Forecasting concludes, “the United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion.”

Similarly, Russia’s Kommersant-Vlast’ magazine cited officials at Western embassies in Tbilisi as claiming ten hours after the Georgian attack began,

“Can’t you see that Russia decided to surrender South Ossetia? May be it is good that the [Georgian attack] happened now; later on everyone will be better off.”

But 15 hours after the Georgian attack began, the first Russian armor and artillery arrived north of South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvaliand, following a warning, opened fire on Georgians, forcing their retreat.

In the next 48 hours, backed by the Russian Air Force, a combined Russian-Ossetian force proceeded to defeat the professional Georgian army, trained and equipped by the United States since 2001.

By the night of August 11, Georgian forces fled from Georgian areas near South Ossetia, abandoning tanks and other weapon systems and leaving the local population
unprotected. The Russian forces have since come into Georgia and have been systematically destroying Georgian military facilities within reach.

So far U.S. reaction has been limited to sending humanitarian aid to Georgia, blocking of the Russian proposals on the conflict at the United Nations Security Council, verbal calls for a Russian pullout, which is currently underway, and threats that Russia would pay a price for its intervention.

Georgian officials said candidly that they counted on more U.S. support. In a press call with Western media on August 13, Georgian leader Mikhail Saakashvili said that “the reputation that America has gained since the Cold War is going to hell right now. This is tragic.”

Georgia’s Ambassador to the United Nations Irakli Alasania suggested on the same day that “many Georgians expected the West would intervene,” including with “military support.”

But as U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates stressed in his August 14 briefing: “The United States spent 45 years working very hard to avoid a military confrontation with Russia,” Mr. Gates said in apparent reference to the 1963 Cuba missile crisis. “I see no reason to change that approach today.”

Georgian leadership coming under domestic criticism

With Russian occupation continuing, most Georgians are wary of criticizing their leader Mikhail Saakashvili, whom most observers blame for the crisis. But criticism from his political rivals already began to emerge.

Georgia’s ex-president Eduard Shevardnadze, whom the Saakashvili- led opposition forced out in 2003, told Bild, a German newspaper, “Georgia should not have intervened in [the South Ossetian capital] Tskhinvali in such an illprepared manner. This was a grave mistake,” the Times of London reported on August 13.

And Nino Bourjanadze, Georgia’s former acting president, Parliament Speaker and key Saakashvili ally who resigned last May, promised Reuters news agency she would return to active politics and said that Mr. Saakashvili will soon face “tough questions” over the failed campaign.

Other leaders from pro-Western opposition parties were blunter.

Ivlian Khaindrava of the Republican Party told Georgia’s Mteli Kvira newspaper that this it is a “tragedy that lives and welfare of thousands of people have been sacrificed to infantile complexes of the commander-in-chief.”

And Kakha Kukava of the Conservative Party told the Financial Times that “Saakashvili was personally responsible for the military operation, and for starting a war we could not win.”

Turkey takes middle ground between U.S. and Russia, revives regional pact idea

Following the Russian military victory in Ossetia and U.S. criticism of Russia, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan flew to Moscow on what was referred to as a “visit of solidarity.”

While Mr. Erdogan also visited Tbilisi, and Turkey, like Azerbaijan and Armenia, dispatched humanitarian aid to Georgia, Ankara did not join in Western criticism of Russia’s actions.

And in August 16 interview with Britain’s Guardian newspaper, President Abdullah Gul said that the Georgia crisis showed that the United States could no longer shape global politics on its own, and should begin sharing power with other countries.

“I don’t think you can control all the world from one centre,” Mr. Gül told the Guardian shortly before hosting the visiting Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.

“There are big nations. There are huge populations. There is unbelievable economic development in some parts of the world. So what we have to do is, instead of unilateral actions, act all together, make common decisions and have
consultations with the world. A new world order, if I can say it, should emerge.”

Moreover, according to the New York Times and McClatchy newspapers, Turkey denied a U.S. request to send a large naval vessel to the Black Sea in a show of U.S. support for Georgia.

Turkey has long resisted facilitating U.S. or NATO naval presence in the Black Sea.

According to the Turkish Daily News, Rep. Mark Kirk (R.-Ill.), a long-time Georgia backer, circulated a “Dear Colleague” letter suggesting that “blocking humanitarian and medical supplies from reaching the people of Georgia is unacceptable. We should expect more from a NATO ally like Turkey.”

Two smaller U.S. vessels, a destroyer USS McFaul and Coast Guard cutter Dallas, will proceed through the Turkish straits toward Georgia later this month in an exercise
planned since earlier this year and for which Turkey granted earlier approval.

Meanwhile Turkey, which seeks to win a United Nations Security Council seat next month, has also revived a regional “peace and cooperation platform,” suggested in the 1990s by then-Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze and Turkish president Suleyman Demirel.

Turkish leaders have reportedly already discussed the idea with all regional leaders except Armenia’s, with Armenian-Turkish talks on ministerial level currently anticipated.

The concept elaborated then would reportedly bring together the three Caucasus states, along with regional powers Iran, Russia, and Turkey.

According to the Turkish Daily News, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matt Bryza was “surprised” by this Turkish initiative.

Chronology: Georgian-Ossetian conflict

First published in August 23, 2008 Armenian Reporter and since slightly updated.

Chronology: Georgian-Ossetian conflict

Early history

(1918–21)

As the Czarist Empire collapses, Ossetians – who are ethnic cousins of Persians and are mostly Orthodox Christians – rise up against Georgian rule. Thousands are killed in clashes before Georgia is occupied by the Red Army in 1921.

1920s–80s

Most majority-Ossetian areas south of the Greater Caucasus Mountains become the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (Province) within Soviet Georgia. Dissent, including
ethnic grievances, are kept tightly in check.

1990–92

As Soviet Union collapses, Ossetians demand greater rights. Georgia’s newly elected nationalist leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia instead abolishes the autonomy altogether and sends armed Georgian units into the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, resulting in atrocities. Georgian forces are eventually forced out of Tskhinvali and Georgia agrees to a Russian-mediated cease-fire, acquiescing to de-facto loss of control over much of South Ossetia.

1992–2004

With the cease-fire patrolled by a small Russian peacekeeping contingent and the Georgian government bankrupt, relative normalcy returns to Ossetian-Georgian relations.

In the mid-1990s, Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze meets his South Ossetian counterpart and negotiates a partial return of refugees. Ethnic Ossetians return to live and work in Georgian towns and Georgians return to live and work Tskhinvali. A large black market springs up at a Georgian village near Tskhinvali.

2004–2008

Mikhail Saakashvili is elected president of Georgia after overthrowing Mr. Shevardnadze through street protests and pledges to return control over South Ossetia and another breakaway former Georgian autonomy, Abkhazia.

With help from the U.S. and Europe, Mr. Saakashvili begins to build up the Georgian army – with the country’s military budget reaching $1 billion in 2007 – and increases pressure on both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including fighting around Tskhinvali in summer 2004 involving mortars that claimed dozens of lives.

At the same time, Georgia seeks Western support and makes joining NATO one of its major foreign policy goals and provides one of the largest contingents in support of U.S. forces in Iraq.

Meanwhile, Russia raises its profile in the long-neglected breakaway republics, extending Russian citizenship to their residents, and serving as their only conduit to the outside world. Russian leaders say they view NATO expansion into Georgia and, another former Soviet republic, Ukraine, as a hostile act.

Through spring 2008, a number of incidents take place in Abkhazia, where Georgia launched unmanned spy planes, which Abkhaz begin to shoot down with Russian help.

By summer 2008, Georgia switches its attention back to South Ossetia.

Run-up to war

June 14 – For the first time in four years, Georgian forces launch mortar fire on Tskhinvali. One person is killed and several are wounded. Russian and European mediators are unable to determine who was to blame for the incident.

June 24 – The Georgian parliament approves the government’s decision to reverse an earlier military spending cut and increases its military budget back to near the
2007 level of about $1 billion.

July 3–4 – More bombings and exchanges of fire occur, including with the use of mortars and grenade launchers, with several more people reported killed in and around Tskhinvali. The sides blame each other. Georgians force Russian peacekeepers from one of the heights near Tskhinvali. Ossetians lambast Russian peacekeepers for failing to maintain peace and begin to mobilize forces and establish defense fortifications.

July 9 – Russia acknowledges its combat plane flew over Georgia, as U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visits Tbilisi and tells Georgians that the United States “always fights for [its] friends.”

August 1–2 – More Georgian mortar shelling of Tskhinvali leaves 6 dead and 21 wounded; the Georgian government member in charge of South Ossetia / Abkhazia policy
arrives in Tskhinvali on August 2 for a meeting with South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity. Following that meeting, Ossetians begin largescale evacuation of women and children from Tskhinvali to Russia.

August 7 – Georgia’s artillery, including large-caliber howitzers and multiple-launch rocket systems, begin to take combat positions around Tskhinvali. After intense shelling throughout the day, Mr. Saakashvili in an evening televised addresses promises to cease fire as Georgian armored and mechanized units begin to move towards South Ossetia.

How the “4-day” Ossetian war unfolded
Some of the main developments

Friday, August 8

00:00 – Shortly before midnight Georgia’s Gen. Mamuka Kurashvili calls commander of 500 Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia Gen. Marat Kulahmetov to tell him that Tbilisi is about to begin an operation to “restore constitutional order” in South Ossetia and urges his forces to stay out of fighting.

At this time, Georgian artillery opens massive fire on the town of Tskhinvali and other areas of South Ossetia; howitzers acquired in Ukraine and Czech Repubic, and Lar-160Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems made in Israel continue shelling Tskhinvali through the morning.



01:00 – Georgian forces advance north of Tskhinvali through South Ossetia’s ethnic Georgian enclaves in an effort to interdict the Roki tunnel – the area’s only land connection with Russia. The move is anticipated by Ossetians, who deploy the bulk of their force to protect the Roki tunnel and adjacent Java district, leaving their capital of Tskhinvali sparsely defended.

[By August 9–10 this Georgian force was surrounded and largely destroyed by Russian and Ossetian forces; days later Georgian leaders admitted they were “too late” in reaching the Roki tunnel and that they underestimated Ossetian and Russian deployments in that area.]

02:00 – Georgian police spokesperson tells journalists that “Georgian [ground] attack is underway, clashes are taking place outside Tskhinvali”; Ossetians confirm engaging Georgian forces, who are using dozens of tanks and armored vehicles supplied by Ukraine and Turkey and equipped with nightvision equipment supplied by the U.S., Israel, and Ukraine. The Georgians begin to overwhelm a smaller and lightly armed Ossetian self-defense.

02:30 – Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried tells journalists in Washington: “We’re urging the Georgians to exercise restraint, but it seems the South Ossetians are the provocative party.” Mr. Fried adds that he sees no Russian involvement so far.

03:15 – In televised remarks, the Georgian government’s main war spokesperson Timur Yakobashvili urges Ossetians to surrender: “Tskhinvali is surrounded…. Illegal armed formations need to surrender.” He reports that Georgian forces have taken five Ossetian villages.

03:30 – The Ossetian leadership appeals for immediate Russian military help. Around this time, first Russian forces begin to enter South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel and build up near Java. By mid-day August 8, there were up to 2,000 Russian mechanized infantry on the ground in support of several thousand Ossetian self-defense who were facing up to 10,000 Georgian forces.

05:00 – Russia calls for an emergency United Nations Security Council meeting to protest Georgia’s actions, which Russia’s Foreign Ministry calls a “massive and treacherous attack.” The council convenes by 07:00 (11 p.m. eST), but amid disagreements between Russia and the U.S., the Security Council remains deadlocked and after days of arguments takes no position on the conflict.

06:00 – Georgian forces enter the Tskhinvali town center, after bypassing Russian peacekeeping forces. Georgia’s Israeli-upgraded aircraft attacks targets in South Ossetia, including in and near Java.

10:00 – Shortly after attending the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing, Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin tells media that Georgia’s actions “will have a response.” At about the same time, the first Russian bombing raid is reported on Georgian military targets around Gori and Kareli just south
of Tskhinvali; Russian helicopters and aircraft begin to attack Georgian forces in South Ossetia.

Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity and security detail in Java.

13:00 – The Russian Defense Ministry in a statement pledges to “protect Russian citizens” in South Ossetia. Soon after, Russia launches tactical missile strikes against Georgian army command and control center near Borjomi, as well as military targets in Gori and Black Sea port of Poti.

15:00 – A Russian tank and artillery unit breaks through a Georgian enclave and arrives north of Tskhinvali. By then Georgians claim to control “70 percent” of the town and call for a cease-fire. About the same time NATO Secretary General also calls for cease-fire.

15:10 – At a press conference in the Kremlin, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev declares that “those who attack Russian citizens [in South Ossetia] will be punished. Russian officials soon brand their military action a “peace-enforcement operation” in Georgia and add that Georgia’s “territorial integrity has suffered a mortal blow,” as far as Tbilisi’s claims on South Ossetia and Abkhazia are concerned.

Georgian forces near Tskhinval. The jeep shown was later captured by an ethnic Chechen unit of the Russian army (see below).

16:00 – Russian artillery fires on Georgian forces in Tskhinvali center forcing them to retreat. The Russian Air Force attacks military targets across Georgia. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili appears on CNN, denies he launched the war, and calls for U.S. help against Russian attacks.

21:00 – Mr. Saakashvili tells Georgians that their army scored a “complete victory” in South Ossetia, while losing “30” service members; Russian TV channels that report continued fighting across South Ossetia and accuse Georgia of an attempted genocide against Ossetians, are taken off the air in Georgia.

Saturday, August 9

Overnight and throughout the day fighting and shelling takes place throughout South Ossetia, with the Russian army engaging and pushing back Georgian forces north of Tskhinvali and the Russian Air Force attacking military targets from the Black Sea to suburbs of Tbilisi.

Georgia's Czech-made Dana howitzers near Tskhinvali on August 9.

Georgian efforts to push through Tskhinvali to relieve Georgian units surrounded in Tamarasheni-Kurta enclave in the north are stalled by Ossetian forces. U.S. aircraft begin to airlift some 1,800 Georgian soldiers deployed in Iraq back to Tbilisi airport.

Later in the day, Georgians shell a Russian army column as it enters Tskhinvali, wounding the Russian commanding officer, Gen. Anatoly Khrulev, along with several Russian journalists, and destroying two Russian tanks and several armored vehicles.

Russia also confirms losing two aircraft that day, with two more lost in subsequent days, including one reportedly to “friendly fire.”

Georgia is believed to have lost most of its fleet of 12 combat aircraft.

19:00 – Mr. Saakashvili says in a televised address that the Georgian military is “sweeping out gangs, who have re-infiltrated in the north of Tskhinvali” and calls for a cease-fire with Russia. Shortly after, police spokesperson Shota Utiashvili claims that Georgians retain control of Tskhinvali and that Java and the Roki tunnel were the Georgian army’s “next target.”

Sunday, August 10

Overnight, Georgian forces begin to pull out of Tskhinvali. The Russian Air Force continues to bomb military targets throughout Georgia, including a military facility near Tbilisi airport, which causes panic and suspension of all flights into Tbilisi. Foreigners in Tbilisi begin to flee to Yerevan to take flights out. Russia begins naval blockade of Georgia and sinks a Georgian patrol boat.

10:00 – Georgia’s president’s national security advisor Kakha Lomaia says that Georgian forces are “regrouping” south of Tskhinvali. Throughout the day Ossetian and Russian units, including the special forces’ Vostok battalion comprised of ethnic Chechens, clear remaining Georgian units out of Tskhinvali.



In the evening, the Russian Air Force continues to attack targets around Georgia. Russian and Abkhaz forces begin to bombard Georgian positions in Abkhazia’s Kodori gorge.

Monday, August 11

Overnight, the Russian Air Force continues bombing raids across Georgia, including one 5 km from downtown Tbilisi. In the morning, Georgian artillery and, reportedly, one surviving aircraft fire on Tskhinvali.



In late morning, Mr. Saakashvili and visiting French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner arrive in the town of Gori, just south of Tskhinvali, to observe collateral damage sustained from Russian attacks on military targets in the town. Just after Mr. Kouchner departs from Gori, Mr. Saakashvili observes an aircraft in the sky and is shown to be running away and then hurriedly whisked away by security guards in a car convoy.

In the afternoon, Russian and Ossetian forces move out of Tskhinvali and begin to reclaim Ossetian villages to the west of town and capture Georgian positions north, east, and south of Tskhinvali.

Destruction in Tskhinval.

Meanwhile, Russian forces from Abkhazia are accompanied by Georgian police as they begin to destroy military bases in Western Georgia, citing violations of the Abkhazia peace agreements.

Czech-made howitzers abandoned by Georgian army (Aug. 12 photo by Artem Drabkin)

17:00 – British journalists on the Gori-to-Tbilisi road observe the Georgian army retreating in panic toward the capital, leaving behind dozens of tanks, artillery, and other military equipment along with civilians. It is unclear what caused the panic, as Russian forces had not yet approached Gori.

Georgian soldiers fleeing Gori.

Later in the evening, Georgian media cites Mr. Saakashvili as claiming that “Russian tanks have taken positions on approaches to Tbilisi”; the Georgian president goes on CNN to declare that Russian tanks are “surrounding” Tbilisi and “we are ready to defend Tbilisi to the last drop of blood.”

Minutes later, Mr. Saakashvili acknowledges that tanks observed near Tbilisi were those of the retreating Georgian army and not of the Russian army. He promises Tbilisi residents a “12-hour warning” before Russian forces come; this causes panic in Tbilisi. Russians deny they intend to enter Tbilisi.

In late evening and subsequent days, Russian forces begin to come into Gori and other Georgian towns without resistance to take over abandoned military equipment and
destroy military bases. Russians also sink the Georgian navy in the port of Poti and force a Georgian retreat from Abkhazia’s Kodori gorge.

Russian soldiers taking a break near Gori.

At the same time, all sides agree to a cease-fire that necessitates a Russian pullout in exchange for the creation of a “security zone” around South Ossetia and international discussions of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s status. Russia promises to pull out from Georgian into the “security zone” by August 22.

Casualties

As of August 19, the Georgian government has confirmed 146 military and 69 civilian deaths, as well as 1,199 military and 270 civilians wounded; 70 persons are reported “missing.” The death toll is expected to rise, since the Georgian army suffered a bulk of casualties in an area now outside its control.

As of August 20, Ossetian officials have confirmed the death of 133 of their residents, both civilians and self-defense fighters. The death toll is expected to rise, but few expect it to reach "more than 2,000 dead” claimed by Ossetian officials at the height of fighting.

Russian forces have confirmed 64 servicem members killed and 323 wounded.

— Compiled by Emil Sanamyan from media sources. All times shown are local Moscow-Ossetia-Georgia time which is eight hours ahead of EST.

In memoriam: Yuri Barsegov

First published in August 23, 2008 Armenian Reporter.

Yuri Barsegov, 83, international law expert and Armenian patriot



Left to right: Masis Mayilian, Yuri Barsegov and Arkady Ghoukasian during negotiations on Karabakh in Helsinki, Finland in 1995.

WASHINGTON – Yuri Georgievich Barsegov, an Armenian patriot, respected expert in international law, and prominent representative of the Russian-Armenian community died in Moscow on August 6. He was 83.

Mr. Barsegov was born in 1925 in Tbilisi to Armenian parents. His father was an army officer and later deputy director of the Tbilisi Aviation Plant and his mother taught Armenian language at a local school.

Following army service on the Soviet-Turkish border between 1943 and 1945, Mr. Barsegov enrolled and graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 1950, and then enrolled in its graduate school, where in 1953 he prepared his dissertation on the subject of “Armenian territories in international
agreements,” focusing on consequences of the Armenian Genocide.

But citing relations with Turkey, the Soviet Foreign Ministry–affiliated Institute refused to hear the dissertation, forcing Mr. Barsegov to drop the Armenian case study and instead defend his degree on a more general topic. (Half a century later, the case study became the basis for Barsegov’s books on the subject.)

After leaving MGIMO, Mr. Barsegov was an international relations editor for the Inostrannaya Literatura (Foreign Literature) press that produced translations of major foreign publications.

From 1962 to 1969 and again from 1972 to 1979, Mr. Barsegov worked at the United Nations Secretariat. From 1969 to 1972 and again from 1979 until his retirement he worked at the Soviet Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), where he headed the Oceans and Environment Department, while teaching at the Moscow University of Peoples’ Friendship.

Over his long career, Mr. Barsegov emerged as a leading authority on the international law of the sea, defending his doctorate on the subject at the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy in 1984 and from 1986 to 1987 serving as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Preparatory Commission for the International Seabed Authority and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.

From 1987 to 1991, Mr. Barsegov represented the Soviet Union as a member of the United Nations General Assembly’s International Law Commission of experts.

Author of more than 500 works on international law, Mr. Barsegov was a life-long activist on Armenian national issues, particularly the consequences of the Genocide and campaign for Karabakh’s re-unification with Armenia.

In 1993, at the height of the Karabakh war, Mr. Barsegov published a three-part monograph outlining the international legal bases for Karabakh’s right to self-determination.

From 1993 to 1997 Mr. Barsegov advised the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’s delegation to the peace talks mediated by the Organization for Security and Cooperate in Europe (OSCE). Former senior NKR diplomat Masis Mayilyan who worked with Mr. Barsegov in the 1990s described him to the Armenian Reporter as “a great human being, great patriot, and a great professional.”

In 1999 Mr. Barsegov founded and since led the Armenian Institute of International Law and Political Science under the aegis of the Union of Armenians of Russia (www. sarinfo.org).

Under his leadership, the institute has since published two major Russian-language volumes on the Genocide: The Armenian Genocide: A Crime under International Law (2000) and the three-part The Armenian Genocide: Turkey’s Culpability and Responsibilities of the International Community (published between 2002 and 2005).

At the time of his death, Mr. Barsegov was working on a book on the history of Armenia’s international relations.

In recognition of his accomplishments, Mr. Barsegov was awarded Nagorno-Karabakh’s Order of St. Mesrop Mashtots and Armenia’s Mkhitar Gosh medal (both in 2000), elected a member of Armenia’s National Academy of Sciences in 2005, and received a special presidential prize from President Serge Sargsian earlier this year in recognition of Mr. Barsegov efforts for Genocide affirmation.

Just last month, in a letter of appreciation to President Sargsian, Mr. Barsegov asked to donate funds from that latter prize, totaling $10,000, to the Armenia Fund’s program supporting the families of Artsakh freedom fighters killed or wounded in combat.

According to the Union of Armenians of Russia, a wake and burial arrangements for Mr. Barsegov took place in Moscow on August 9. Mr. Barsegov is survived by his son Georgi Barsegov, who is a senior counselor with the Russian Foreign Ministry.

— Prepared by Emil Sanamyan drawing on materials made available by the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia and the Union of Armenians of Russia.

An exercise in disinformation: linking PKK to NKR

First published in August 2, 2008 Armenian Reporter. For graphics, including chronology see www.reporter.am archive.


An exercise in disinformation: linking Kurds to NKR
News analysis by Yelena Osipova and Emil Sanamyan

WASHINGTON – Turkish and Azerbaijani officials have frequently sought to link Armenians to the Kurdish resistance in Turkey, typically referred to as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). But they have provided little to no evidence to substantiate such linkages.

These allegations made a comeback between last October and earlier this year at a fairly high level and with all the hallmarks of an organized disinformation campaign.

This analysis seeks to deconstruct the chronology of this effort aimed against Armenia.

Background

Allegations linking Armenia to Kurdish political activism in Turkey are not new. Azerbaijan’s motivation for this is to win and maintain Turkey’s support and to position itself as fighting a “common enemy” in Karabakh.

Turkish nationalists, in turn, seek to portray the PKK as a non-Muslim and even anti-Muslim entity, appealing to religious and ethnic biases in the fight for the hearts and minds of Turkey’s Kurdish population.

In the early 1990s, frequent Turkish claims that Armenia provides support to PKK also helped build up an excuse for Turkey’s potential intervention in the Karabakh war on the side of the losing forces of Azerbaijan.

At one point in 1992, that campaign was inadvertently facilitated by Armenia’s own propaganda, which suggested, falsely, that the mostly ethnically Kurdish population
of areas between Karabakh and Armenia proper welcomed Armenian forces as liberators. (Yezidi Kurds from Armenia proper were even reported to have been bused to Lachin for that purpose.)

In fact, by the 20th century, most of Azerbaijan’s ethnically Kurdish population was thoroughly Turkified and they now mostly self- identify as Azerbaijanis.

Azerbaijan’s ethnic Kurds reportedly include such well-known characters as Azerbaijan’s late national leader Heydar Aliyev, as well as wartime chief of national police and local Grey Wolves franchise Iskender Hamidov, who famously promised to wipe out Yerevan and Stepanakert with two nuclear strikes.

First salvos

In August 2007, Yusuf Halacoğlu, head of the Turkish Historical Society, ultranationalist and Armenian Genocide denier, announced that his studies on the origins of Anatolian tribes showed many Kurds, particularly Kurdish Alevis, were originally Armenian.

As events unfolded, Mr. Halacoğlu’s comment appeared to have been motivated primarily by politics.

In an interview with Uluslararası Haber Dergisi in October 2007, Mr. Halacoğlu said many “people” who think they are Kurds may be mistaken, and the case is the same with “the terrorist groups who tried to be identified as Kurdish Alevis or Kurds.”

(Incidentally, after 15 years at the helm of Turkish official historiography, Mr. Halacoğlu was replaced by the Turkish government this week.)

Somewhat unexpectedly, this line of reasoning was reflected in the remarks made by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey during an official visit to the United States in early November 2007.

After being questioned by an Armenian Embassy staff member on Turkey’s Armenia policy in a public meeting hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Mr. Erdoğan demurred on the need to distinguish the terrorists from the Kurdish population at large, saying, “In the terrorist organization [PKK], there are Kurds, Armenians, others.” (He said this even though no ethnic Armenian member of the PKK was ever identified dead or alive, at least in the last decade.)

More importantly, during his visit, Mr. Erdoğan and Turkey’s friends in the U.S. government, succeeded in having President George W. Bush declare the PKK to be America’s enemy.

“They are an enemy of Turkey, they are an enemy of Iraq, and they are an enemy of the United States,” Mr. Bush declared that November, while also authorizing U.S. forces in Iraq to assist Turkey in their attacks against the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Azerbaijan jumps in

On November 30 Zaman, a newspaper close to the Turkish government, quoted the heretofore unknown Federation of Turkish-Azeri Associations’ Secretary General Mehmet Azeriturk as claiming, “Armenia is making an effort to bring PKK militants into the cities of Şuşa [Shushi], Lacin [Berdzor] and Fuzuli, to be able to keep these cities it has occupied.”

No reference was made as to where Mr. Azeriturk acquired that information. The Zaman article also said that Armenian officials have denied any such contacts with the PKK.

But just days later, Azerbaijan’s deputy foreign minister Araz Azimov, apparently citing the “Zaman report,” declared that Azerbaijan is ready to perform “counter-terrorist” operations against PKK military units “positioned” in Karabakh.

Azerbaijan’s Zerkalo reported Mr. Azimov saying that the PKK’s presence in the occupied territories “shows the international community that we were right in our earlier statements [making the link between the PKK and Karabakh].”

Armenians had always had a penchant for terrorists, he added.

The international echo

On December 11 the Azerbaijani allegations were promoted by the Russian journalist Aleksei Baliev. Writing for RPMonitor.ru, an online political journal, he compared “the Lachin corridor” linking Armenia and Karabakh to “Iraqi Kurdistan” as a safe haven for the PKK.

An Armenian Yezidi community leader Aziz Tamoyan had, earlier in December, endorsed the presidential candidacy of then-Prime Minister Serge Sargsian. Mr. Baliev linked this endorsement to Kurdish hopes for Armenia’s support for establishing “a Kurdish autonomy” in areas between Karabakh and Armenia proper.

(Although Mr. Tamoyan’s endorsement came in a joint press community leader, Rimma Varzhapetian, who also backed Mr. Sargsian, Mr. Baliyev did not suggest that the Jews of Armenia were also hoping to establish themselves in Lachin.)

The nonsensical nature of the argument did not stop Paul Goble, a former U.S. official now employed as research director for the Azerbaijani Academy of Diplomacy, from indirectly endorsing the claim in his personal blog the next day, suggesting that “the Kurdish initiative in Armenia provides those opposed to any settlement [over Karabakh] with yet another means to block it.”

By December 20, the Azerbaijani government allegations were presented as fact by Anar Valiev, a fellow at the Masaryk University in the Czech Republic and apparently a native of Azerbaijan.

The PKK’s (supposed) decision to move to Karabakh, Mr. Valiev stated in the December 20 issue of Global Terrorism Analysis, published by the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation, is “rational, well thought-out and could benefit both sides.”

Mr. Valiev went on to suggest that Turkey would never “chase” the PKK in Nagorno-Karabakh out of fear that any such action would come to involve several other states, upsetting the fragile balance in the region.

For Armenians, on the other hand, harboring the PKK would help to bolster the region’s population and provide “hundreds – if not thousands – of experienced guerilla fighters.”

Mr. Valiev cited Mr. Baliev’s commentary as one of his sources.

Israeli and American spillover...

In January 2008, an unofficial and frequently inaccurate Israeli source, DEBKAfile, alleged that PKK leaders had started “acting on a decision they had reached in November to move their bases from the Qandil Mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan to the predominantly ethnic Armenian South Caucasian region of Nagorno- Karabakh.”

The online publication said it got the information from its “sources [that] have picked up rumors,” which were also supported by “PKK defectors who turned themselves in to Turkish forces.”

DEBKAfile added that no transfer of the Kurdish bases had been confirmed as of January 28. However, it also said that a group of PKK chiefs were reported to have visited Kurdish villages in Karabakh looking for support. (No such villages in fact exist in Karabakh.)

A sort of a culmination of the campaign occurred in February 2008, when Mr. Azimov met with visiting U.S. State Department coordinator on terrorism Frank Urbanic (whom Azerbaijani media renamed “Urbanchik”).

Mr. Azimov told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) after the meeting that the PKK was the main focus of their talks. He expressed concern over the “PKK building ‘close relations’ with ‘terrorist groups and organizations’ that are enemies of both Turkey and Azerbaijan – a remark seen in Baku as a reference to Armenia or ethnic-Armenian forces,” RFE/RL reported.

A public affairs officer at the U.S. Embassy in Baku was quoted as saying that the United States is “increasingly concerned about what appears to be growing ties between the PKK and other groups in the Caucasus” and the “threat the PKK poses to energy infrastructure in the [region].”

But the annual State Department report on terrorism issued on April 30 did not contain references to Azerbaijani allegations.

These remarks were followed by several articles on the subject in the Turkish media. The Journal of Turkish Weekly, an online publication of the Turkish lobby in the United States, wrote, “It is reported that the Karabakh authorities provide a safe haven for international terrorism.”

The Journal, citing suspect sources, claimed that 56 PKK members had settled in Karabakh and that “terror camps” were established in the region. The Journal went on to claim that the Israeli intelligence organization Mossad “had warned Turkey and Azerbaijan about the PKK movements.”

…and denials

Contacted by the Armenian Reporter this week, Ehud Gol, Israel’s ambassador to Armenia, dismissed these reports as “a baseless story.”

He said he had no knowledge of the matter and viewed it as a bad piece of journalism with no credible sources.

Mr. Gol added that because of this, Israel had not issued any formal denial, adding, “We do not have any reason to believe [these reports are] true.”

While the United States did not formally endorse Azerbaijani or Turkish allegations, signs of interest on the part of at least some U.S. officials can be seen in the State Department’s award of a fellowship grant to Dr. Mark Yoffe to study the Yezidi Kurdish community in Armenia in September 2007.

“The U.S. Embassy in Armenia was interested in all aspects of Yezidi Kurdish life,” Dr. Yoffe told the Reporter in July. Asked about whether the Armenian state plays any role in Kurdish political activism, Dr. Yoffe said, “There are issues that might or might not involve Yezidi Kurds. However, my research does not show that Armenians are involved in them in any way.”

Dr. Yoffe, a specialist in Slavic languages at the George Washington University, held a presentation of his findings last February, noting that rather than serving as a potential connection to the PKK, Yezidi Kurds in Armenia “spoke badly” about Turkish Kurd emissaries who occasionally visited their villages, because “for Yezidis, Kurds are synonymous with Muslims and this is often given as a reason for antipathy.”

Dr. Yoffe was told that despite the emissaries’ attempts “to recruit Yezidis into their armed struggle or raise funds for their causes,” the Yezidis asked them to leave the villages, after which they stopped coming.

What it all means

“Pursuit of ‘terrorists’ or the presence of terrorists in a given territory has been used as pretext by states around the world for military operations,” Hratch Tchilingirian of the University of Cambridge told the Armenian Reporter via e-mail.

Indeed, while constantly threatening a new war in Karabakh, Azerbaijan is increasingly at a loss when it comes to providing contemporary reasons for its acrimony, with wartime grievances steadily shifting into the historical realm.

In the absence of aggressive behavior by the Armenian side, Azerbaijan has sought to invent it, coming up with baseless allegations – on subjects ranging from the environment to crime to security – that are designed to win international sympathy.

At the same time, Azerbaijan has worked to keep international access to Karabakh as restricted as it possibly can – a difficult task in an increasingly transparent and interconnected world.

Nevertheless, with the Caucasus as remote as it is, Azerbaijan frequently succeeds in having its disinformation published by reputable media and even in foreign government publications such as the many annual reports that the State Department is mandated to release.

In a drawn-out public relations war such small bureaucratic coups too can serve as small victories.

Writing on May 27 in the Soros Foundation–funded Eurasianet. org, Stephen Blank, a commentator on regional affairs who teaches at the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania, suggested, “The mere fact that Turkish and Azerbaijani media outlets are complaining about a Kurdish militant presence in Karabakh should spur the international community to action [on Karabakh],” he said, calling for “redoubled efforts” on the resolution of the Karabakh issue, in order to “eliminate, or at least greatly diminish the chances” of any aggressive developments.

While stressing that the allegation linking the PKK to Karabakh is unsubstantiated, Dr. Tchilingirian agreed that “for Azerbaijan it could serve as a pretext to test military operations in the Karabakh region in the name of ‘rooting out terrorists’ that pose a threat to Turkey.”

In this case, Azerbaijan attempted to piggy-back on America’s support for Turkey’s fight against the PKK, but it once again failed to win outright Turkish government support for the effort.

When contacted this week, the Azerbaijani Embassy in Washington refused to comment on the matter.

The “Kurdish” campaign appeared to have come to an abrupt end, or at least an extended intermission in late February – early March.

It is unclear if that had something to do with Armenia’s presidential elections and subsequent domestic developments in both Armenia and Turkey; or, more modestly, with completion of prepublication research for the State Department’s terrorism report.

Senate approves Ambassador to Armenia

First published in the August 2, 2008 Armenian Reporter.

Yovanovitch nomination clears Senate
After debate, Committee gives nod to ambassador-designate to Armenia
by Yelena Osipova and Emil Sanamyan

WASHINGTON – The Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 29 voted to endorse the nomination of Marie L. Yovanovitch as the next United States ambassador to Armenia. The full Senate quickly approved the nomination on August 1.

The position has been vacant since September 2006, when Ambassador John M. Evans was recalled for speaking openly about the Armenian Genocide.

The administration’s previous nominee for the position, Richard Hoagland, received the committee’s endorsement in late 2006, but the consideration of his nomination by the full Senate was blocked by Senator Robert Menendez (D.-N.J.)

The Bush administration resubmitted the nomination in 2007, at which time the senator once again blocked it. The administration ultimately withdrew the nomination.

The Armenian government has publicly encouraged a quick confirmation of Ms. Yovanovitch’s nomination. As a sign of the importance the Armenian government attached to this matter, Tatoul Markarian, Armenia’s ambassador to the United States, was present as the committee voted.

The administration continues to refuse to use the word genocide to characterize the Armenian Genocide.

But, whereas Mr. Hoagland had initially argued that the events of 1915–17 may not fit the definition of genocide, Ms. Yovanovitch has stated repeatedly that it is up to the president to decide whether she, as ambassador, could characterize the events as genocide.

Most senators said they were still not satisfied with the administration’s position on the Genocide.

In a voice vote, they nonetheless allowed the nomination of Ms. Yovanovitch to move forward. Senators cited a State Department letter issued the day of the vote that, one senator said, marked a “significant step forward” in the administration’s appreciation of the issue.

Sen. Boxer remains in opposition

Sen. Barbara Boxer (D.-Calif.) was the sole committee member registering a vote against confirmation.

Criticizing the administration for its refusal to use the term genocide in reference to the destruction of the Armenian people in Asia Minor, she described her vote as “support for the truth.”

While acknowledging Ms. Yovanovitch’s experience and competence, Ms. Boxer said she could not vote in favor because the nominee refused to use the word genocide.

“Why can’t she just say, ‘I personally see this as genocide, but the administration does not want me to use that word. So, although in my personal view it was a genocide, I cannot call it so [officially]’?” the senator asked.

Ms. Boxer added that although she would be voting in opposition, she would take no other action to block the nomination.

Sen. Menendez notes better State Department rhetoric

Mr. Menendez, like Ms. Boxer, expressed dissatisfaction that Ms. Yovanovitch would not express her own opinion on the Armenian Genocide. He noted that when U.S.
ambassadors are sworn in, they do not “say that ‘I take an oath to the President of the United States, this or any future president.’”

Rather, they swear to uphold the Constitution, he noted, arguing that ambassadors should be able to express their opinions more freely when testifying before Congress.

Mr. Menendez cited a letter he had received from the State Department the day of the vote as a reason he was not voting against the nomination. The letter clarified testimony by Ms. Yovanovitch about a proposed State Department program to “bring archivists from Turkey and Armenia to the United States for professional training.”

It said the program did not intend to “open a debate” on the facts “of the mass killings and deportations of Armenians committed by Ottoman soldiers and other Ottoman officials in 1915.”

The letter of clarification, signed by Matthew A. Reynolds, acting assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs, added, “We indeed hold Ottoman officials responsible for those crimes.”

Mr. Menendez said that for an administration that has frequently called for the characterization of the events of 1915 to be left to historians, this response was a “significant step forward,” encouraging him to vote in favor of the nominee.

Sen. Ben Cardin (D.-Md.) also spoke in opposition to the administration’s policy, noting that from Ms. Yovanovitch’s responses to the committee it is “clear that the nominee acknowledged that what happened [to Armenians] was genocide,” even if she was forced not to publicly use the term.

Sen. Biden thanks Armenian-Americans

In his remarks, the committee chair, Sen. Joe Biden (D-Del.), recalled the commitments made by the State Department to work toward the improvement of Armenia-Turkey relations and to address Turkey’s genocide denial.

The committee chair said that the ultimate objective is to get Turkey to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide for all sides to move forward. Mr. Biden praised the Armenian- American community for its position on the issue and acknowledged the role played by senators in pressing the administration.

As part of the confirmation process, Senators Biden, Boxer, Cardin, and Menendez, and fellow committee members Bob Casey (D.-Penn.), Norm Coleman (R.-Minn.), Russ Feingold (D.-Wis.), John Kerry (D.-Mass.), and Barack Obama (D.-Ill.) had pressed the State Department for answers on issues relating to the U.S. policy on the Armenian Genocide, U.S.-Armenia relations, and regional matters.

(See the Armenian Reporter for July 5, 12, 19, and 26 for the full texts of the correspondence.)

Briefly: U.S. on Armenian and Azerbaijani politics, Turkish ruling AKP avoids ban

Washington Briefing
by Yelena Osipova and Emil Sanamyan

U.S. wants Armenian government to succeed on democracy

“It is in the interest of the U.S.-Armenia bilateral relationship and in the interest of the Armenian people to see the new government in Yerevan succeed in deepening Armenia’s democratic development,” U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer said in a prepared statement on July 29.

Recalling his tour of the Caucasus earlier this summer (see this page and the editorial page in the June 28 issue of the Armenian Reporter), Mr. Kramer stressed the need for the Armenian authorities to take timely steps – the release of opposition activists, an independent investigation, and dialogue – “to heal the serious divisions in the country that the presidential election and its violent aftermath exacerbated.”

Overall, Mr. Kramer’s remarks on Armenia were a departure from the sharp rhetoric he employed while in Yerevan.

Similarly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matt Bryza said earlier in the month that while the United States wanted to see the Armenian government do more on democracy, the United States is “seeing some positive momentum” and that “the direction has shifted and is much better.”

Referring to President Serge Sargsian, Mr. Bryza told the RFE/RL Armenian Service in a July 19 interview, “It seems that President Sarkisian understands the challenges that face the country and what issues need some work. We have seen some leadership from him on a number fronts and we appreciate that.”

Mr. Bryza also praised Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian for “setting a good example as he takes on tough issues [such as government corruption] and is advancing a reform agenda.”

For his part, Mr. Kramer singled out Human Rights Defender Armen Harutiunian, appointed by former President Robert Kocharian, for “playing an important role on behalf of democratic reform in the country.”

Congressional human rights commission discusses Azerbaijan

Members of Congress, officials, and activists expressed various degrees of concern with Azerbaijan’s treatment of dissenters during a July 29 hearing organized by the U.S. Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission) and described as “biased” by an Azerbaijani presidential aide the next day.

The hearing was timed to precede Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev’s widely anticipated reelection on October 15 in balloting seen by most as a mere formality. Mr. Aliyev inherited the presidency after his father, Heydar Aliyev, died in 2003.

In testimony, Chris Walker of Freedom House, a human-rights advocacy group, noted that growing revenues from energy production have emboldened Azerbaijan’s government and diminished any remaining hopes for democratic changes.

Later in the hearing, Commission co-chair Rep. Alcee Hastings (D.-Fla.) quoted Mr. Aliyev as saying recently, “those who say that something is going wrong in Azerbaijan … should look in the mirror at their own country. Attempts to apply pressure will just cause tension in our relations. While several years ago we may not have reacted to this pressure or kept silent, we are not silent today.”

Indeed, speaking for Mr. Aliyev the next day, his aide Elnur Aslanov described views expressed at the hearing as “biased and provocative.”

“Azerbaijan has its own path leading to democracy which conforms to the level of development of state and society,” he told the Trend news agency.

“Senior Azeri officials have already suggested a third term [through 2018] for President Aliyev,” Mr. Walker said, adding that it appears that “the country is laying the foundations for a possible leader-for-life system,” as in most Central Asian states.

Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer expressed U.S. concerns that “political space for dissenting voices has been shrinking over the past few years,” pointing to the continued imprisonment of dozens of political prisoners. They
include journalist Eynullah Fatullayev, imprisoned after being labeled a “traitor” for his visit to Armenia and Karabakh. (See this page in the Nov. 3, 2007, issue of the Armenian Reporter.)

Mr. Kramer dismissed Azerbaijan’s efforts to link all its failings to Armenian misdeeds. “The unresolved conflict … over Nagorno- Karabakh is not a valid reason for either country to avoid respecting media freedom or engaging in other essential components of democratization,” he said.

Mr. Hastings pointed to his criticism of the Bush administration and wondered whether he could “still be walking around Baku” had he done something similar in Azerbaijan.

In a telling response, Azerbaijan’s ambassador, Yashar Aliyev, said, “I don’t know.”

“I think that is a fair answer to perhaps what was a rhetorical question,” Rep. Hastings went on amid laughter in the room. “And that is that my butt would be in jail.”

Commission members Sen. Robert Burr (R.-N.C.) and Rep. G.K. Butterfield (R.-N.C.) focused their remarks on the imprisonment of former millionaire government member Farkhad Aliyev, who fell out with the Azerbaijani president in 2005; Rep. Hilda Solis (D.-Calif.) raised concerns over prosecution of Christian minorities, and Sen. Ben Cardin (D.-Md.) made general observations about the need for reform.

No concerns over anti-Armenian hate speech in Azerbaijan were raised as part of the hearing.

Wiesenthal Center notes “confusion” over Rabbi Cooper’s Azerbaijan comments

This column last week reported on the visit by Rabbi Abraham Cooper of the Los Angeles–based Simon Wiesenthal Center to Baku during which he heard anti-Armenian hate speech from Azerbaijan’s religious leader and was reported by Azerbaijani media as praising the country for its “tolerance” and even “condemning” Armenians.

Contacted by the Armenian Reporter last week and this, Rabbi Cooper was not available for an interview. But the Center’s public relations director Avra Shapiro facilitated the following comment on behalf of Rabbi Cooper via e-mail: “My visit to Baku [was in part] to brief religious leaders who will shortly be visiting the U.S.... I read the article [from Azerbaijani media] that was written very carefully. It seems that whoever wrote the headline may have confused the comments of the [Azerbaijani] Parliamentary Chairman [condemning Armenians] with mine. For the record, what I did state was that the systematic destruction of any houses of worship would be an outrage.”

Rabbi Cooper has not so far provided comment on the Azerbaijani religious leader’s hate speech toward Armenians and how that fits into his reported praise of Azerbaijan’s tolerance.

The latter claim was this week sited by an Azerbaijani presidential aide as evidence of his country’s good behavior and in response to criticism of Azerbaijani government during the U.S. Helsinki Commission hearing on July 29.

Turkish ruling party avoids ban, gets off with “warning”

Turkey’s Constitutional Court did not endorse a proposed ban on the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) but decided to cut half of its state funding in a ruling made on July 30, news agencies reported.

Six judges voted in favor of banning the party, four voted for financial penalties, while one judge rejected the case, CNN reported. Seven votes were required for the court to approve the ban.

The case was filed by the country’s chief prosecutor in March, as part of the struggle between the mildly Islamist AKP and Turkey’s secular elite, which includes the military and the judiciary.

Despite the rejection of closure, the case issued “a serious warning” to the party, court chair Hasim Kilic said.

Mithat Sancar, a law professor at Ankara University, told the New York Times that the ruling does not mean the party is cleared of charges. “Cutting the party’s treasury funds means that the evidence for their anti-secular activity was there but not substantial enough to impose a ban,” he said.

More than 20 parties, mostly pro-Islamist or pro-Kurdish, have been banned by the courts for posing a threat to Kemalist secular principles. However, this was the first case against a party with a large parliamentary majority.

The court decision came just days after a heretofore unknown group set off two bombs in an Istanbul residential area, killing 17 passers- by including five children, and
wounding some 150.

The attack, on July 27, came shortly after six people – three police officers and three assailants – died in an attack near the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul on July 9.

It was the worst case of terrorism in Turkey since two synagogues, a British consulate, and a bank were bombed in November 2003, acts of terror blamed on local Islamic radicals.

Turkish officials said they suspected that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was responsible for July 27 attack, with the PKK itself denying any involvement.

Writing for the Jamestown Foundation, Istanbul-based journalist Gareth Jenkins noted that neither PKK nor Islamic radicals have been known for random attacks on residential areas in Turkey.